Di che cosa parliamo quando parliamo di diritti: uguaglianza, differenze, queer

Abstract

This paper presents a critique of the Enlightenment concept of rights. Based as it is on equality, it deploys the term in both a descriptive and a prescriptive way, acting as a device to exact the performance of normalcy, and to deprive anyone who proves either unwilling or unable to comply of the “right to have rights”. A queer analysis of equality shows it to be constructed collusively, through the socially shared decision not to notice a number of traits, and to concentrate instead on what two or more objects have in common despite their inevitable differences. To opt out of this collusion means to embark on a radical critique of equality as the foundation of a philosophy of law, and to replace it with a nuanced and respectful consideration of the different and incommensurable needs and vulnerabilities of all sentient beings.